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The Coupling of State and Sharia Justice Systems in a Secular State: The Case of Ethiopia
Girmachew Alemu Aneme
Abstract:
The constitutional recognition of the Sharia justice system in Ethiopia has given rise to 
normative and judicial plurality. Both state and Sharia justice systems relate to a distinctive 
basis of legitimacy or justice; the state justice system is based on the Constitution of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia while the basis for the Sharia justice system is the 
divine law of Islam as revealed in the Quran. This paper reflects on the incongruences and 
incompatibilities in the relation between state justice and Sharia justice systems within the 
Ethiopian legal system. A closer analysis of the landmark case of Kedija Bashir et al. allows 
some important insight into the issue of constitutional and judicial review of the decisions of 
Sharia courts. Here, the objective of the paper is to explore the possible common normative 
grounds that would provide autonomy for each system, while maintaining a minimal 
normative standard in the sense of ‘ordre public’.
Zusammenfassung:
Die verfassungsrechtliche Anerkennung der Sharia Gerichtsbarkeit hat der äthiopischen 
Rechtswissenschaft eine Diskussion über Rechts- und Justizpluralität beschert. Der 
vorliegende Beitrag geht der Frage nach, inwieweit es im Verhältnis des Sharia-Rechtssystems 
zum staatlichen Recht Äthiopiens zu Widersprüchen und evtl. zur Unvereinbarkeit einzelner 
Regeln und Prinzipien kommt, die durch die Trennung der Gerichtsbarkeiten noch 
verstärkt werden. Beide Rechtssysteme basieren auf unterschiedlichen Legitimations- 
und Gerechtigkeitsgrundlagen. Während das staatliche Recht durch die Verfassung der 
Föderalen Demokratischen Republik Äthiopien legitimiert wird, bezieht das Sharia-Recht 
seine Legitimation aus dem göttlichen Recht des Islam, wie es der Koran überliefert. Die 
grundsätzlichen Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichts und der für die Bewahrung des 
Verfassungsrechts zuständigen Organe in der Sache Kedija Bashir et al., die hier ausführlich 
analysiert werden, ermöglichen wichtige Einblicke in die Voraussetzungen und Wirkungen 
gerichtlicher und insbesondere verfassungsgerichtlicher Kontrolle von Entscheidungen der 
Sharia Gerichte. Die Untersuchung lotet den Spielraum für eine gemeinsame normative 
Grundlage beider Rechtssysteme aus, auf der ihnen die gebotene Autonomie gewährt wird 
und die zugleich einen beiderseits anerkannten normativen Mindeststandard – im Sinne von 
‘ordre public’ – gewährleisten kann.
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1. Introduction1
Historically, Islam came to Ethiopia in the year 615 A.D. with the arrival of Muslim migrants 
fleeing persecution in the Arabian Peninsula. This episode of migration was called ‘the first al-
hiǧra al-ūlā’.2 Over the centuries, Sharia law has been applied by local Muslim communities in 
their daily lives. Thus, it is not surprising that by the mid twentieth century, Sharia had entered 
the public sphere, with the Ethiopian state providing official recognition of classical Islamic 
jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh3) in 1942, which allowed for the establishment of Sharia courts with 
the purpose of adjudicating personal and family cases on the basis of Islamic law.4 Currently, 
approximately 34 percent of Ethiopia’s population of 94 million are followers of Islam.5
The recognition of Sharia justice system in Ethiopia gave rise to normative and judicial 
plurality. Normative plurality emerges from the coexistence of different sources of order 
and leads to judicial plurality through the development and expansion of institutions which 
serve the various sources of order. The Ethiopian Federal Constitution and regional state laws 
provide regulations for the official recognition of Sharia courts and of Islamic law as an official 
source of law. By determining spaces of autonomy for decision-making on the basis of Islamic 
law, these regulations account for the intercoupling of state and Islamic laws.6 Nonetheless, 
the coexistence of the state and the Sharia justice systems is not always smooth due to the 
distinctive basis of each system’s legitimacy. In the relationship of two coexisting normative 
systems, inconsistencies or normative collisions can occur.
This paper reflects on some of the collisions between the state and Sharia justice systems in 
the context of the Ethiopian legal system. The second section below highlights the principles 
for the constitutional recognition of the Sharia justice system in Ethiopia. The third section 
provides an overview of the parallel Ethiopian state and Sharia justice systems and the conditions 
that underlie the constitutional recognition of the Sharia justice system. The fourth section 
analyses the landmark Kedija Bashir et al. case in a bid to reflect on the issue of constitutional 
1 Acknowledgments: I would like to thank Dr. Matthias Kötter and Dr. Hatem Elliesie for their 
constructive and insightful comments on earlier versions of this article and for their hospitality in 
Berlin. I am grateful to the management and staff of the Collaborative Research Center at the Free 
University of Berlin for the opportunity to work on this article as a visiting scholar under the research 
project ‘Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood’.
2 See Seidel, Katrin/Elliesie, Hatem 2014: The Current Stage of Research on Contemporary Islam in 
Ethiopia, in: Elliesie, Hatem (ed.): Multidisciplinary Views on the Horn of Africa, Köln: Rüdiger 
Köppe, 75–89 with further references; See also: Hussein, Ahmed 2007: History of Islam in Ethiopia. 
Encyclopaedia Aethiopica III, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 202–208.
3 For more detail, see Elliesie, Hatem 2014: Binnenpluralität des Islamischen Rechts: Diversität religiöser 
Normativität rechtsdogmatisch und -methodisch betrachtet, SFB-Governance Working Papers Series, 
No. 54, Berlin.
4 Proclamation No. 12 of 1942, The Kadis Court Proclamation of 1942. After two years, the Kadis and 
Naibas Councils Establishment Proclamation No. 62/1944 was issued to consolidate the Sharia courts.
5 The Ethiopian Central Statistical Agency at http://www.csa.gov.et, accessed on October 1, 2017. Estimates 
from the Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs put the total 
population at 96,506,031 as of July 1, 2014, while according to the World Bank, the total population of 
the country in the same year is estimated to be 94,100,756.
6 See Kötter, Matthias 2015: Non-State Justice Institutions: A Matter of Fact and a Matter of Legislation, 
in: Kötter, Matthias/Schuppert, Gunnar Folke/Röder, Tilmann J./Wolfrum, Rüdiger (eds.): Non-State 
Justice Institutions and the Law, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 174–175.
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and judicial review of the decisions of Sharia courts. The final section will offer concluding 
remarks.
2. Constitutional Recognition of the Sharia Justice System 
In 1995, Ethiopia was reconstituted as a federal republic that recognized its ethnic, cultural, 
and religious diversity in a radical break with its long unitary past. Consequently, the Federal 
Constitution7 became the first constitution in the legal history of the country to recognize the 
application of religious and customary laws in personal and family cases.
Article 34(5) of the Federal Constitution provides for the following principle: ‘This 
constitution shall not preclude the adjudication of disputes relating to personal and family laws 
in accordance with religious or customary laws, with the consent of the parties to the dispute.’ 
According to Article 78(5) of the Federal Constitution, federal and state legislatures have three 
ways of granting official status to religious and customary courts: the direct establishment of 
religious and customary courts, the official recognition of existing religious and customary 
courts functioning as de facto informal justice systems, and the reorganization/consolidation of 
existing religious and customary courts functioning on the basis of official recognition before 
the promulgation of the Federal Constitution. The federal and state legislatures have taken the 
third path, i.e. reorganizing/consolidating the religious courts of Sharia that had operated on 
the basis of earlier subsidiary laws.8 To date, the courts of Sharia are the only religious courts 
in the country.
3. The Parallel Existence of State and Sharia Justice Systems
3.1 The State Justice System
The Ethiopian state justice system is composed of the federal legislature (House of 
Representatives), regional legislative bodies (State Councils), and a dual state judicial system 
with two parallel court structures: the federal courts and the regional state courts with their 
own independent structures and administrations. The federal courts have jurisdiction over 
cases arising under the Federal Constitution, federal laws, and international treaties, as well as 
over parties specified in federal laws.9 Federal courts are composed at three levels: the Supreme 
Court (which also incorporates a cassation bench to review fundamental errors of law from 
7 Proclamation No. 1/1995, Proclamation of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia (FDRE Constitution), August 21, 1995.
8 The federal government and all regional states but two (the regional states of Gambella and Afar) have 
issued laws consolidating the courts of Sharia that were operating prior to the promulgation of the 
FDRE Constitution.
9 See Federal Courts Proclamation 25/1996, as amended by Federal Courts (Amendment) Proclamation 
138/1998, Federal Courts (Amendment) Proclamation 254/2001, Federal Courts (Amendment) 
Proclamation 321/2003, and Federal Courts Proclamation (Re-amendment) Proclamation 454/2005, 
Article 3.
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all lower courts), the High Court, and the First Instance Court.10 Similarly, all regional states 
have established their own courts at three levels: state Supreme Courts (which incorporate a 
cassation bench to review fundamental errors of law on state matters), High Courts, and First 
Instance Courts.11 The power to preside over constitutional disputes is given to the House of 
Federation, the federal upper chamber composed of representatives of the different nations, 
nationalities, and peoples of the country.12
Diagram: The Structure of Federal and Regional State and Sharia Courts in Ethiopia.
3.2 The Sharia Justice System
3.2.1 The Structure of Courts of Sharia 
The Ethiopian Sharia justice system is composed of federal and regional courts of Sharia that 
are reorganized on the basis of federal and state laws. All Sharia courts but one throughout the 
country possess a three-tiered judicial structure.13 For example, the Federal Courts of Sharia 
include: 
(1) the Federal First Instance Court of Sharia; 
(2) the Federal High Court of Sharia; and 
(3) the Federal Supreme Court of Sharia.14 
10 There also exist municipal and social courts at the federal and regional level in towns and districts, 
respectively as part of the state justice system. 
11  FDRE Constitution (n 7), Article 78(3).
12 FDRE Constitution (n 7) Article 61(1).
13 See diagram above. The exception is the Harari Sharia Court that has only two tiers: supreme court 
and first-instance court. See the Harari People National Regional Government Courts and Judicial 
Administration Council Establishment Proclamation 3/1996, Articles 29 and 30.
14 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 3.
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3.2.2 Accountability 
All but one Sharia court in the entire country are accountable to the federal and regional 
judicial administration commissions, which are also responsible for the administration of 
formal state courts.15 For instance, the Federal Courts of Sharia are accountable to the Federal 
Judicial Administration Council.16 The Federal Judicial Administration Council is the organ 
that appoints and decides on disciplinary matters concerning the judges of the Federal Courts 
of Sharia.17 The Council is composed of the following members:18 
a. The President of the Federal Supreme Court, Chairperson;
b. The Vice-President of the Federal Supreme Court; 
c. Three members of the House of Peoples’ Representatives; 
d. The Minister of the Federal Ministry of Justice;
e. The President of the Federal High Court;
f. The President of the Federal First Instance Court;
g. A Judge selected by all Federal Judges;
h. A lawyer appointed by the Council from those practicing in the Federal Courts;
i. Law academic appointed by the Council from a recognized higher education institution; 
j. A distinguished citizen appointed by the Council.
 The Federal Courts of Sharia submit a bi-annual report on their performance to the president 
of the Federal Supreme Court.19 Moreover, the president of the Federal Supreme Court receives 
and approves the work plan and budget of the Federal Courts of Sharia.20 Also, it is the president 
of the Federal Supreme Court that recommends the appointment of judges to the Federal 
Courts of Sharia by the Federal Judicial Administration Council.21
3.2.3 Criteria for the Appointment of Kadis (Sharia Court Judges)
A single Kadi ( judge) sits at each division of the First Instance Court of Sharia, while a presiding 
Kadi and two other Kadis sit in each division of the Federal High Court of Sharia and the 
15 The exception is the Tigray Court of Sharia which is accountable to the Regional Sharia Administration 
Commission. See Proclamation No. 133/2007 of the Tigray National Regional Government issued to 
consolidate Courts of Sharia, Articles 19–21.
16  Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 3.
17  Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 17(1), (2), (3), and Article 18.
18 The Federal Judicial Administration Council is primarily concerned with the regulation of formal 
federal courts. See Amended Federal Judicial Affairs Council Establishment Proclamation No. 684/2010, 
Article 6.
19 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 20(3).
20 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 20(4).
21 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 17(3).
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Supreme Court of Sharia.22 All cases at Sharia courts are heard in public with the exception of 
cases where the Civil Procedure Code permits otherwise.23
According to Article 16 of the Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 
188/1999, a person must meet the following criteria in order to be appointed to a Federal Court 
of Sharia as a Kadi:
a. The person must be an Ethiopian citizen.
b. The person must be trained in Islamic law in Islamic educational institutions, or must 
have acquired adequate experience and knowledge in Islamic law.
c. The person must have a reputation for diligence and good conduct.
d. The person should consent to be a Kadi.
e. The person must be older than twenty-five. 
The criteria for the appointment of Kadis in the regional Sharia courts are similar. An exception 
is the Harari regional Sharia court, which requires knowledge of the Arabic language.24
The Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs25 recruits Federal Sharia Court judges at the request 
of the Federal Judicial Administration Council.26 The Federal Judicial Administration Council 
approves the appointment of the judges on the basis of recommendation by the president 
of the Federal Supreme Court.27 The Federal Judicial Administration Council can remove 
Federal Sharia Court judges from office.28 The Federal Constitution prohibits the removal of 
judges before retirement age, except for violation of disciplinary rules, gross incompetency 
or inefficiency, or illness that prevents the judge from carrying out his responsibilities.29 The 
Federal Judicial Administration Commission makes such determinations and decides on issues 
of promotion, disciplinary complaints, and other  conditions of employment of Federal Sharia 
court judges.30
22 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 13(1) and (2).
23 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 15(2). See subsection 3.2.7 
below on applicable laws in Sharia courts.
24 See the Harari People National Regional Government Courts and Judicial Administration Council 
Establishment Proclamation 3/1996, Article 31.
25 The Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs is a non-governmental representative organ of Ethiopian 
Muslims.
26 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 17(1).
27 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 17(3). The President and 
Vice-President of the Federal Supreme Court are appointed by the House of Peoples’ Representatives 
upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister. See FDRE Constitution (n 7), Article 81.
28 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No.188/1999, Article 18.
29 FDRE Constitution (n 7), Article 81.
30 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Articles 17 and 18. See also Amended 
Federal Judicial Affairs Council Establishment Proclamation No. 684/2010, Article 6.
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3.2.4 Budget and the Enforcement of Decisions 
Sharia courts are financed primarily by direct budgetary subsidies from the federal and regional 
governments.31 The courts are allowed to acquire financial assistance from other sources, as 
well.32 All executive organs and individuals are duty-bound by law to execute or compel the 
execution of decisions and orders from all Sharia courts.33 Insofar as the courts of Sharia depend 
on budgetary subsidies from the state, they are faced with problems similar to those of state 
courts, such as the shortage of work tools and skilled personnel.
3.2.5 Consent as a Basis for Jurisdiction
The mandate of all Sharia courts is based on the voluntary consent of parties to the jurisdiction 
of such courts.34 Consent should be expressed clearly on a confirmation form provided by the 
legislature.35 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 5(1). 
Where one party has objected to adjudication by the courts of Sharia or where no clear consent 
has been provided from one of the parties, the Sharia court before which the case is brought is 
obliged to transfer the case to a regular state court.36
Nevertheless, the Federal Courts of Sharia Proclamation also contains elements of implied 
consent: ‘where a party properly served with summons… does not confirm his objection or 
consent by appearing before the registrar of the court, he shall be presumed not to have objected 
and the case shall be heard ex parte’.37 The Tigray regional courts of Sharia allow a party to 
present her/his consent or objection before a final decision is passed, upon showing that the 
individuals in question could not present their objection or consent at the first hearing because 
of one of the reasons specified in the Tigray regional law on courts of Sharia.38
Even though consent of all parties is a fundamental requirement for the courts of Sharia to 
exercise jurisdiction, in practice, the issue of consent is not as clear as it appears in the law. For 
instance, a credible research report found that judges in Sharia courts could simply ignore the 
requirement of consent.39 In the landmark case of Kedija Bashir et al., the clear and repetitive 
31 See for instance the Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 19.
32 See the Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 19(2). These sources 
are not specified.
33 See the Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 23.
34 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 5. The requirement of 
consent is also clearly stated under Article 34(5) of the FDRE Constitution.
35  Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 5(1).
36  Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 5(3).
37 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 5(2).
38 The reasons are: A recent death of family member, absence due to work-related travel to a remote area, 
detention in a police station or imprisonment in jail, and absence due to sickness and treatment that 
can be certified. See Proclamation No. 133/2007 of the Tigray National Regional Government issued to 
consolidate courts of Sharia, Articles 6(3) and (4).
39 See Tadesse, Hilina 2001: The Shari’a as Regards Women, in: Berchi: The Journal of Ethiopian Women 
Lawyers Association, 1 (2), 142, where the author stated: ‘During an EWLA workshop some Kadis [ judges 
in Muslim courts] made it clear that they simply ignored Article 34(5)’s consent requirement.’
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objection to the jurisdiction of the courts of Sharia by the defendant was ignored by judges at 
three levels of Sharia courts, giving rise to a constitutional dispute.40 The issue of consent is 
further complicated by the absence of legal aid services well-versed in the Sharia justice system 
– who might help litigants to make the proper decisions concerning consent.  
3.2.6 Material, Subject-Matter, and Personal Jurisdiction 
3.2.6.1 Material Jurisdiction 
All courts of Sharia have specific material jurisdiction at each level. The Federal Supreme Court 
of Sharia has jurisdiction over all decisions of the Federal High Court of Sharia, rendered in 
its first-instance jurisdiction as well as in its appellate jurisdiction.41 The Federal High Court 
of Sharia has first-instance jurisdiction over cases involving an amount of over 200,000 birr 
and appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the First Instance Court of Sharia.42 Moreover, the 
Federal High Court of Sharia has jurisdiction over application for change of venue within the 
courts of Sharia. The Federal First Instance Court has jurisdiction over cases involving up to 
200,000 birr and over cases whose value cannot be expressed in monetary terms.43
3.2.6.2 Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
Article 34(5) of the Federal Constitution proclaims that courts of Sharia have jurisdiction only 
over personal and family matters. The Federal Courts of Sharia proclamation specifies the 
following personal and family matters as the basis for a common jurisdiction of the Federal 
Courts of Sharia:44
(a) any question regarding marriage, divorce, maintenance, guardianship of minors, and 
family relationships; 
(b) any question regarding Wakf, gift/Hiba/, succession of wills;  
(c) any question regarding payment of costs incurred in any suit relating to the aforementioned 
matters.
3.2.6.3 Personal Jurisdiction 
Sharia courts have multiple bases for personal jurisdiction. For instance, in cases arising from 
marriage, divorce, maintenance, guardianship of minors, and family relationships, the Federal 
Courts of Sharia have personal jurisdiction if the abovementioned acts were concluded on the 
40 See section 4 below on the Kedija Bashir et al. case.
41 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 8(1) and (2).
42 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 9(1), (2) and (3).
43  Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 10.
44  Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 4(1) (a), (b), (c).
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basis of Islamic law or if the parties have consented to using Islamic law.45 In cases arising out 
of Wakf, gift, or succession of wills, the endower and donor must be Muslim. In the case of 
succession, the deceased must have been a Muslim at the time of death.46
3.2.7 Applicable Laws 
All courts of Sharia in Ethiopia adjudicate cases on the basis of Islamic law.47 Yet there is no 
clear guideline for the school of thought concerning the Islamic law that is applied in these 
courts. Moreover, the courts of Sharia at the federal and regional levels operate independently. 
As such, they do not synchronize their work in an effort to develop Islamic jurisprudence, in the 
context of common cases, at a regional level or throughout the country. Furthermore, the Sharia 
courts do not publish their judgments – an act which would help to reflect upon and build up 
knowledge on the applied laws and reasoning in Sharia courts. 
In addition to substantive Islamic law, the courts of Sharia are required to follow the civil 
procedure laws promulgated by the state.48 Nonetheless, the courts of Sharia are not barred 
from using Islamic procedural rules. It is not clear what will or should happen in cases of 
conflict between Islamic law and state procedural law. For instance, Seidel claims that unlike 
state procedural rules, Islamic law favours testimony from male witnesses and followers of 
Islam, which is not the case in state procedural rules.49
4. The Judicial and Constitutional Review of the Decisions of Courts of Sharia: A Comment 
Based on Kedija Bashir et al. case 
This section focuses on the legality and effect of the judicial and constitutional review of the 
decisions of the courts of Sharia by the Federal Supreme Court and the House of Federation 
vis-à-vis the status of the courts of Sharia as part of the non-state religious justice system that 
functions primarily on the basis of Islamic law. To this end, the landmark case of Kedija Bashir 
et al. will be analysed.50 The Kedija Bashir et al. case passed through all levels of Federal Sharia 
45 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 4 (1) (a).
46 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 4(1) (b).
47 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 6(1).
48 See Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No 188/1999, Article 6(2). Proclamation No. 
133/2007 of the Tigray National Regional Government issued to consolidate courts of Sharia.
49 Seidel, Katrin 2012: State-Recognized Legal Pluralism in Ethiopia: The Relationship between Islamic 
Family Law and State Law, in: African Law Association (ed.): Recht in Afrika – Law in Africa – Droit en 
Afrique, Köln: Rüdiger Köppe, 228–229.
50 The case came to be known as the Kedija Bashir case after the applicant who refused to submit to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of Sharia and went all the way to the Constitutional Inquiry Council (CCI). 
The case has been cited by a number of writers on human rights and legal pluralism. See, for Instance, 
Assefa, Getachew 2008: Federalism and Legal Pluralism in Ethiopia: Reflections on their Impacts on 
the Protection of Human Rights, in: Alemu, Girmachew/Alemahu, Sisay (eds.): The Constitutional 
Protection of Human Rights in Ethiopia: Challenges and Prospects, Human Rights Law Series, Vol. 
1, Addis Abeba: Addis Ababa University Press. Nonetheless, there has never been a full and proper 
presentation of the case yet by anyone. This writer has consulted all court documents of the case from 
the First Instance Naiba Court up to the CCI to prepare the full summary of the case under sections 
4.1 through 4.5. All the dates in this review are translated to Gregorian calendar from the Ethiopian 
calendar used by the courts and state institutions.
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courts before its review by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division, the Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry, and the House of Federation. 
Sections 4.1 through 4.5 below provide the anatomy of the Kedija Bashir et al. case, focusing on 
the main issues raised in the courts of Sharia, the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division, 
the Constitutional Inquiry Council, and the House of Federation. Section 4.6 is a reflection on 
the legality and effect of the judicial review of the Kedija Bashir et al. case by the Federal Supreme 
Court Cassation Division, while section 4.7 reflects on the constitutional review of the case. 
4.1 The Initial Pleading and the Decisions of the Courts of Sharia 
i) The Kedija Bashir et al. case was initially instituted at the  third Naiba First Instance Court 
of Sharia51 in Addis Ababa on November 14, 1999. The plaintiffs were Mrs. Aysha Ahmed, Mrs. 
Fantu Ali, Mrs. Leila Hussein, and Mrs. Bedria Issa. The defendants were Mrs. Kedeja Bashir, 
Mr. Ibrahim Hassen, Mr. Ahmed Hassen, and Mr. Mohamed Hassen. 
ii) The plaintiffs claimed to be heirs to their late grandfather, Mr. Aman Shene. The plaintiffs 
also claimed that Mr. Aman’s residence, a house located in Addis Ababa at Woreda 2, Kebele 11, 
No. 439, was in the hands of the defendants, who are also the grandchildren of the late Mr. 
Aman Shene. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants refused to recognize their right to their 
grandfather’s house. The plaintiffs pleaded with the court to order the defendants to hand over 
their share on the ‘basis of part 4, chapter 4 of the Sharia law’. The plaintiffs presented a tax 
document and listed three witnesses who could verify that Mr. Aman Shene was the owner of 
the abovementioned dwelling house. 
ii) On December 14, 1999, the defendants submitted their preliminary objection to the First 
Instance Sharia Court stating in writing that they did not wish to be adjudicated by the court 
on the basis of their right to refuse its jurisdiction, pursuant to Article 34(5) of the Federal 
Constitution. Also, the defendants alleged that the suit was res judicata, as the issue had been 
settled in another case between the parties in a regular state court on the basis of the Ethiopian 
Civil Code. 
iii) In a written response on January 4, 2000 to the First Instance Sharia Court, the plaintiffs 
rejected the preliminary objection of the defendants. In its session on March 13, 2000, the court 
issued a decision that overruled the defendants’ preliminary objection against its jurisdiction. 
The reason provided by the court was that the defendants did not appear in court when they 
were summoned to explain their preliminary objection. The court further found that another 
case filed by the defendants in the regular state court had nothing to do with the present case 
and was closed by the time the applicants filed the present case.
51 The Naiba court was operating on the basis of the Kadis and Naibas Council Establishment Proclamation 
No. 62/1944, which is repealed by the Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999.
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iv) On July 5, 2000, the First Instance Sharia Court in Addis Ababa passed a judgment on 
the merits of the case and ordered the defendants to hand over the plaintiffs’ share of their 
grandfather’s house. 
v) The defendants appealed to the Federal High Court of Sharia and argued that the First 
Instance Sharia Court had erroneously passed its verdict on the merits of the case, even though 
the defendants had clearly notified the court that they did not accept its jurisdiction on the 
basis of Article 34(5) of the Federal Constitution. In their response to the appeal, the respondents 
(the initial plaintiffs) agreed that Article 34(5) of the Federal Constitution requires consent but 
contended that the consent of one party was enough for the court to assume jurisdiction.   
vi) On April 17, 2003, the Federal High Court of Sharia upheld the decision of the First Instance 
Sharia Court. In its ruling, the Federal High Court of Sharia stated that Article 34(5) of the 
Federal Constitution needed enabling law to be applied by the courts of Sharia. According to 
the court, the present case was filed before the promulgation of the Federal Courts of Sharia 
Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/99, making the latter inapplicable to the case. 
vii) Subsequently, the defendants submitted their second appeal to the Federal Supreme Court 
of Sharia, which rejected the appeal as inadmissible on May 28, 2003. 
4.2 The Ruling of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division
On June 1, 2003, the defendants filed their memorandum of appeal to the Federal Supreme 
Court Cassation Division contending that the decisions of the courts of Sharia (at all three 
levels) contained fundamental error of law because the courts had ignored their preliminary 
objection against the jurisdiction of the First Instance Court of Sharia. In its ruling from July 25, 
2003, the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division rejected the submission of the appellants 
stating that there was no fundamental error of law committed by the courts of Sharia. 
4.3 The Petition to the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (CCI)
A) On October 2, 2003, the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWLA) filed a petition to the 
CCI52 on behalf of Mrs. Kedija Bashir, a member of EWLA and one of the initial defendants in 
the present case. EWLA based its petition on Articles 17, 20(2), and 23 of Proclamation 250/200153, 
Article 4(1) of Proclamation 251/200154, and Articles 9(1), 13, and 83 of the Federal Constitution.
52 The FDRE Constitution (n 7), Article 62(1), Article 82(1); Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation 
250/2001, Article 17(2), Article 19. The Council of Constitutional Inquiry is an organ established by the 
Federal Constitution with the power to examine applications that require constitutional interpretation 
and submit its recommendation to the House of Federation for final decision.
53 Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation No.250/2001.
54 Consolidation of the House of Federation and the Definition of its Powers and Responsibilities 
Proclamation No.251/2001.
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B) In its petition, EWLA argued that the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation 
Division and the courts of Sharia were in violation of Article 34(5) of the Federal Constitution, 
one of the basic provisions under the a bill of rights section of  the Federal Constitution. EWLA 
outlined the following main arguments as a basis for its petition to the CCI:
1) The decisions of all the courts contradict Article 9(1) and Article 13(2) of the Federal 
Constitution.55
2) Article 34(5) of the Federal Constitution shall be interpreted in light of Articles 14 and 18 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Ethiopia is a party. 
3) Under Article 34(5) of the Federal Constitution, religious laws cannot be applied unless there 
is consent from all parties to a dispute.
4) The requirement of consent under Article 34(5) of the Federal Constitution should be 
observed by religious courts without a mandatory reference to subsidiary laws. Moreover, in 
this particular case, the Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/99 had 
entered into force at the time of the commencement of the case at the First Instance Sharia 
Court.
4.4 The Recommendation of the CCI 
In its December 11, 2003 deliberation, the CCI found that the decision of the First Instance Sharia 
Court had violated Article 34(5) of the Federal Constitution and recommended the nullification 
of the decision on the basis of Article 9(1) of the Federal Constitution. The CCI forwarded the 
following main reasons as a basis for its recommendation: 
A) The CCI noted that the First Instance Sharia Court, the High Court of Sharia, and the Supreme 
Court of Sharia have all admitted that both the Federal Constitution and Proclamation No. 
188/99 require consent of the parties to adjudicate cases on the basis of religious law. 
B) Nonetheless, the courts of Sharia rejected the defendants’ preliminary objection against 
the jurisdiction of the First Instance Sharia Court, claiming that the case was filed before 
Proclamation 188/99 had come into force. However, the CCI noted that Proclamation No. 188/99 
had entered into force well ahead of the preliminary objection against the jurisdiction of the 
First Instance Sharia Court by the defendants. Thus, the application of Proclamation 188/99 
could not be taken as a retroactive application of the law. 
C) The CCI reasoned that even if the application of Proclamation 188/99 was overlooked, the 
Federal Constitution had entered into force when the initial plaintiffs in this case filed their 
petition to the First Instance Sharia Court. The CCI further pointed out that the mere fact that 
55 Article 9(1) of the Federal Constitution (n 7) states: ‘The Constitution is the supreme law of the land. 
Any law, customary practice or a decision of an organ of state or a public official which contravenes this 
Constitution shall be of no effect.’; Article 13(2) of the Federal Constitution states: ‘The fundamental 
rights and freedoms specified in this Chapter shall be interpreted in a manner conforming to the 
principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenants on Human Rights 
and International instruments adopted by Ethiopia.’
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Article 34(5) of the Federal Constitution refers to enabling law does not alter the fundamental 
essence of the principle that affirms, in its own right, that no one shall be judged on the basis 
of religious or customary law without his/her consent. 
4.5 The Decision of the House of Federation 
The House of Federation deliberated on the legal opinion given by its Standing Committee on 
Constitutional and Regional Affairs on the recommendation of the CCI on May 7, 2004. On the 
same day, the House approved the recommendation of the CCI with one abstention.
4.6 The Legal Basis and Effect of the Power of Cassation of the Federal Supreme Court over 
Courts of Sharia
In the Kedija Bashir et al. case, the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division passed a ruling that 
rejected the appellants’ petition, stating that there was no fundamental error of law committed 
by the Federal Courts of Sharia.56 However, the Federal Supreme Court did not provide the basis 
for its jurisdiction to review the decisions of the courts of Sharia. The Federal Constitution 
proclaims that the ‘Federal Supreme Court has a power of cassation over any final court decision 
containing a basic error of law’.57 The Federal Courts Proclamation,58 the implementing law 
on the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court, does not grant a power of cassation to the 
Federal Supreme Court to review the decisions of courts of Sharia. 
Moreover, there is no reference to the possibility of cassation review of the decisions of courts 
of Sharia by the Federal Supreme Court under the Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation 
Proclamation. To the contrary, the proclamation provides that the Federal Courts of Sharia 
are given exclusive jurisdiction over a case brought before them. Once a case is brought before 
a court of Sharia and consent is clearly given by the parties involved, such a case cannot be 
transferred to a regular court.59 Thus, with the exception of the general and controversial phrase 
‘over any final court decision’ within the Federal Constitution, there is no clear legal basis for 
the Federal Supreme Court to exercise cassation power over decisions of courts of Sharia.60
Even if one were to establish a power of cassation for the Federal Supreme Court over the 
decisions of courts of Sharia, such a mandate gives rise to range of issues. The first relates to 
56 The ruling on the absence of fundamental error of law by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation 
Division contrasts with two recent cases reviewed by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division. 
In W/o Salia Ibrahim et al. vs. Haji Seman Issa (Cassation File No. 31906) and W/o Shamse Yenus vs. W/o 
Nuria Mame (Cassation File No. 38745), the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division found that the 
violation of the right of individuals to choose between state courts and courts of Sharia constituted 
fundamental error of law.
57  FDRE Constitution (n 7), Article 80(3) (a).
58 See Federal Courts Proclamation 25/1996, as amended by Federal Courts (Amendment) Proclamation 
138/1998, Federal Courts (Amendment) Proclamation 254/2001, Federal Courts (Amendment) 
Proclamation 321/2003, and Federal Courts Proclamation (Re-amendment) Proclamation 454/2005.
59 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 5(4).
60 For analysis of the debate, see Abdo, Muradu 2007: Review of Decisions of State Courts over State 
Matter by the Federal Supreme Court, in: Mizan Law Review, 1 (1), 60–74.
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the fact that the courts of Sharia are non-state religious justice institutions established on the 
basis of the constitutional recognition of the application of religious law in personal and family 
cases.61 The rationale for such recognition is the accommodation of diversity in establishing 
justice systems that are different in their jurisdiction and structure from regular state courts. 
Thus, cassation review of the decisions of courts of Sharia by the Federal Supreme Court 
amounts to a review of a separate and parallel non-state justice system by a state justice system. 
Also, the cassation review of the decisions of Federal Courts of Sharia by the Federal Supreme 
Court adds to the unwarranted powers of the Federal Supreme Court over the Federal Courts of 
Sharia, which (at least theoretically) occupy an autonomous position.62
The second problem relates to the applicable substantive law by the courts of Sharia. Even 
though the courts of Sharia are obliged to apply the civil procedure laws promulgated by the 
state,63 the substantive law applied by the courts in the adjudication of cases is Islamic law.64 
The Federal Constitution recognizes the application of Islamic law by the courts of Sharia. The 
Federal Supreme Court does not have the legal mandate and capacity to review the application 
of Islamic law. Moreover, limiting the scope of the cassation review to the interpretation and 
application of state procedural laws applied by Sharia courts may not be a straightforward 
solution, since such review may result in the unintended interpretation of substantive Islamic 
law. The only comparable instance that could justify the review of the application of Islamic 
law by the courts of Sharia would be the protection of constitutional rights, which is not the 
mandate of the Federal Supreme Court.65
The third issue relates to the binding interpretation of law that is rendered by the Federal 
Supreme Court Cassation Division. Introducing the doctrine of stare decisis, Proclamation 
454/2005 provides that decisions of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division on the 
interpretation of laws are binding on federal, as well as state courts at all levels, when rendered 
by no fewer than five judges.66 Proclamation 454/2005 does not stipulate that courts of Sharia 
are to be bound by the interpretation of law rendered by the Federal Supreme Court Cassation 
Division. Such stipulation would have been absurd considering that Islamic law is the substantive 
law applicable in Sharia courts. 
In practice, the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division has rendered binding interpretation 
of law at least in two cases that originated in the Federal Courts of Sharia and in the Oromia 
61 FDRE Constitution (n 7), Article 34(5) and Article 78(5). Article 34(5) of the FDRE Constitution provides 
the principle: ‘This Constitution shall not preclude the adjudication of disputes relating to personal 
and family laws in accordance with religious or customary laws, with the consent of the parties to the 
dispute. Particulars shall be determined by law.’ For the common jurisdiction of the Federal Courts of 
Sharia, see the Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 4(1) (a), (b), (c).
62 See Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 17(3), Article 18, Article 
20(3) & (4).
63 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 6(2).
64 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 6(1).
65  See section 4.7 below on the constitutional review of decisions of the courts of Sharia.
66 See Federal Courts Proclamation Re-amendment Proclamation 454/2005, Article 2(1).
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Courts of Sharia.67 Nonetheless, the idea of maintaining a uniform interpretation of law68 
through binding decisions from the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division is contrary to 
the recognition of courts of Sharia as institutions that apply a different set of rules on the basis 
of their own method of interpretation and reasoning.
At this juncture, it is worth noting that the Federal Supreme Court of Sharia is not endowed 
with the power of cassation review, which might have been used to maintain uniform 
interpretation of substantive and procedural laws within the Sharia justice system. An ad-hoc 
cassation hearing is held in the Federal Supreme Court of Sharia when a fundamental difference 
between the divisions of the Federal Supreme Court of Sharia in the interpretation of Islamic 
law occurs.69 Such oversight does not extend to the differences of interpretation that may occur 
in the First Instance and High Courts of Sharia. Moreover, the review mandate does not cover 
the differences in the interpretation of state procedural laws applied by the courts of Sharia.70
4.7 The Constitutional Review of the Decision of Courts of Sharia 
4.7.1 The Legal Basis for Constitutional Review 
As outlined under section 4.3 above, EWLA’s petition to the CCI states that the decisions of the 
Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division and the courts of Sharia have violated Article 34(5) 
of the Federal Constitution. The CCI is an organ established by the Federal Constitution with 
the power to examine applications that require constitutional interpretation and to submit its 
recommendation to the House of Federation for final decision.71 The Council of Constitutional 
Inquiry Proclamation specifies that the CCI has the power to investigate a petition that alleges 
that ‘any law or decision given by any government organ or official’ is contrary to the provisions 
of the FDRE Constitution.72 Article 2(6) of the English version of the Council of Constitutional 
Inquiry Proclamation defines ‘state organ’ rather than ‘government organ’. Nonetheless, the 
67 See Mrs. Salia Ibrahim et al. vs. Haji Seman Issa (Cassation File No. 31906) and Mrs. Shamse Yenus vs. 
Mrs. Nuria Mame (Cassation File No. 38745) in Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions, 
Volume 9.
68 See Abdo 2007: 70. See also ‘Message from the President of the Federal Supreme Court’, Federal 
Supreme Court Cassation Division Decisions, Volume 9.
69 Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No 188/1999, Article 20 (6) states: ‘He [the Chief 
Kadi] may, on his own initiative, or suggestions made to him by the divisions of the court or upon 
petitions made by parties to a dispute, direct cases involving a basic difference between divisions of 
the Federal Supreme Court of Sharia, as regards interpretation of Islamic law, to be heard by a division 
composed of not less than five Kadis.’
70 Strangely enough, the criteria for appointment of Kadis of the Federal Courts of Sharia do not include 
knowledge of state procedural laws, even though the Federal Courts of Sharia are obliged to apply 
state procedural laws. The Federal Courts of Sharia Consolidation Proclamation No. 188/1999, Article 
16 provides the following criteria for the appointment of Kadis: ‘Any Ethiopian who: 1) is trained in 
Islamic law in Islamic Educational Institutions or has acquired adequate experience and knowledge in 
Islamic law; 2) is reputed for his diligence and good conduct; 3) consents to assume the position of a 
Kadi, and 4) is more than twenty five years of age’.
71 FDRE Constitution (n 7), Article 62(1), Article 82(1); Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation 
250/2001, Article 17(2), Article 19.
72 Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation 250/2001, Article 17(2). Emphasis added.
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Amharic version of Article 2(6) is consistent with Article 17(2) when it refers to ‘Yemengist Akal’ 
to mean federal and state legislative, executive and judicial organs, and other organs that are 
granted judicial power.73
In the Kedija Bashir et al. case, the CCI investigated the petition for constitutional review 
of the decisions of the courts of Sharia and of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division, 
all judicial organs that are listed under Article 2(6) of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry 
Proclamation. Thus, lex lata, it is clear that the CCI and the House of Federation have the power 
to review the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division and of the courts of 
Sharia.74 What is not clear, however, is whether the CCI and the House of Federation can review 
the final judgment of the courts of Sharia passed on the basis of Islamic law. The next section 
considers this issue. 
4.7.2 The Constitutional Review of the Judgments of Courts of Sharia 
We can identify four instances where violation of the Federal Constitution may occur in the 
operation of courts of Sharia:
(1) where the consent of all parties to a dispute is not provided; 
(2) when the subject matter of a case does not fall within the jurisdiction of the courts of Sharia;
(3) when there is error in the application of state procedural laws; 
(4) when the final judgment of a case contradicts the Federal Constitution. 
Constitutional review in the first three instances listed above is not controversial. This is 
because consent, jurisdiction, and procedural laws are all part of state-made laws. The CCI 
recommendation and the decision of the House of Federation in the Kedija Bashir et al. case is 
an example of constitutional review in the first instance. 
The constitutional review at the fourth instance i.e. the review of the final judgment of courts 
of Sharia, is controversial due to the application of Islamic law in dealing with cases before 
these courts. For instance, Mohammed Abdo states that ‘if parties to a dispute voluntarily take 
their case to a sharia court, the outcome should be exempted from constitutional standards’ 
and further argues that ‘…subjecting [the] final decision of sharia courts to the supremacy 
clause and the human rights norms of the constitution goes against the very essence of legal 
pluralism advocated by the Constitution.’75 Even though it is true that the Federal Constitution 
protects normative and judicial pluralism, such protection is not a carte blanche, especially 
vis-à-vis the recognition and protection of human rights under the constitution. In fact, the 
Federal Constitution clearly proclaims that the obligation of the state relates to ‘the duty to 
73 See Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation 250/2001, Article 2(6) English and Amharic 
versions.
74 The power of the House of Federation to review the decisions of courts is controversial. See for instance 
Mulatu, Abebe 2011: Issues of Constitutional Interpretation under the 1995 Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia Constitution: The Case of Kedija Beshir et al. vs. Ansha Ahmed et al.’, in: Wonber-
Alemayehu Haile Memorial Foundation’s Periodical, 8th Half Year, 46–54.
75 Abdo, Mohammed 2011: Legal Pluralism, Sharia Courts and Constitutional Issues in Ethiopia, in: 
Mizan Law Review, 5 (1), 100.
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support, on the basis of equality, the growth and enrichment of cultures and traditions that are 
compatible with fundamental rights, human dignity, democratic norms and ideals, and the provisions of 
the Constitution’.76 Moreover, the Federal Constitution imposes a specific duty on all legislative, 
executive, and judicial organs across the country to respect and enforce the provisions of the 
bill of rights under the constitution.77 Thus, the normative and judicial plurality recognized 
under the Federal Constitution is subject to the supremacy clause of the constitution and the 
protection of those rights recognized under the constitution.78 Constitutional review, in this 
sense, is used to ‘ensure the compatibility of ’ the Sharia justice system ‘with a decent standard 
of human rights protection and due process’.79
Absent the possibility of constitutional review, those who choose to utilize religious laws and 
religious justice systems on the basis of their religious belief will be accorded less protection 
or no protection at all of their constitutional rights.80 Moreover, one should not assume that 
all judgments of the courts of Sharia would violate the Federal Constitution. Also, Islamic 
jurisprudence should be taken as an evolving set of rules that may benefit from in-depth 
constitutional review in the context of the latest notions and interpretations of rights.81
5. Conclusion 
The constitutional recognition of the Sharia justice system in Ethiopia poses challenges 
common to the process of recognition of non-state justice systems. As shown in the analysis of 
the Kedija Bashir et al. case, these challenges lead to a decrease in the institutional and normative 
unity of the law and of the courts system. To ensure the maintenance of a common effective 
legal order, the following two issues must be addressed: 
First, the integrity of the Sharia justice system must be constantly assessed and improved 
in relation to the capacity of the judges of Sharia courts, institutional capacity, and autonomy 
from state courts. Judges in Sharia courts lack capacity in their knowledge of both Islamic 
law and state law. Apart from a common course in Islamic law at public universities, there 
is no institution dedicated to the education and training of Kadis in Islamic law as well as 
in constitutional principles. As such, the capacity of Kadis in courts of Sharia leaves much to 
be desired. The problem of capacity affects the quality of justice rendered by the courts and 
derails the development of the Sharia justice system as a viable and dynamic justice system. 
The absence of training may also push Kadis to resort to and apply customary rules rather than 
76  Article 91 of the FDRE Constitution (n 7), emphasis added.
77 Article 13(1) FDRE Constitution (n 7).
78 Article 9(1) of the FDRE Constitution (n 7).
79 Kötter 2015: 178.
80 It is thus unfortunate and hasty for Mohammed Abdo to make the following statement: ‘If final 
decisions rendered by the sharia courts are reviewed by the House of Federation and finally declared 
unconstitutional, this may be treated by Muslim communities as an onslaught on their religious 
values and identity.’ See Abdo 2011: 100.
81 On the evolving nature of Islamic jurisprudence, see Schacht, Joseph 1982: An Introduction to Islamic 
Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 69–75; see also Council of Constitutional Inquiry Proclamation 
250/2001, Article 20(2) on the principle of interpretation in cases that involve the human rights 
protected under the FDRE Constitution.
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Islamic law. Moreover, no reporting and publication of Sharia court decisions and judgments 
exists. Sharia courts are under the extensive administrative and judicial control of the state 
justice system.
Insofar as they apply Islamic law, the Sharia courts can be considered to be religious courts. 
Nonetheless, Sharia courts can also be classified as semi-state courts when seen in light of the 
mandatory application of state civil procedure laws, in light of their accountability to judicial 
administration commissions, and in light of their dependency on government subsidies. On 
the one hand, it is possible to discern the intention of the state in providing standards that 
allow the Sharia justice system to function within the scope of constitutional safeguards. On the 
other hand, extensive regulation may result in the adoption of the more confrontational and 
less productive procedures of the state, rather than community-based mediation and informal 
processes, which are relatively effective and legitimate in the eyes of the followers of the Islamic 
religion.82 Notably, the review of the decisions of the courts of Sharia by the Federal Supreme 
Court Cassation Division is contrary to the recognition and existence of the courts of Sharia 
as part of a separate and autonomous justice system that lives a parallel existence within the 
regular state justice system. 
Second, the state and Sharia justice systems must adhere to a common minimal constitutional 
standard. The most feasible mechanism is constitutional review of all decisions by the state 
and Sharia justice systems to ensure the enforcement of minimal normative standards, e.g. 
the observance of human rights as provided by the Federal Constitution. Unlike the cassation 
review, the constitutional review of decisions of courts of Sharia has a clear legal basis: the 
supremacy clause of the Federal Constitution proclaims that any decision including decisions 
of courts of Sharia that contradict the constitution shall be void. As such, the recognition of 
judicial and legal plurality is a qualified recognition that should operate within the framework 
of the rights protected under the Federal Constitution. Moreover, those who consent to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of Sharia deserve equal protection of their constitutional rights; and 
as an evolving system, Islamic jurisprudence benefits from an in-depth constitutional review 
process in the context of the development of notions and interpretations of the rights protected 
under the Federal Constitution. In this regard, it is worth noting that the CCI must develop the 
capacity to deal with applications that may involve the review of final judgments of courts of 
Sharia.
82 An-Na’im, Abdullahi Ahmed 2011: Religious Norms and Family Law: Is it Legal or Normative Pluralism?, 
in: Emory International Law Review, 25 (2), 786.
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